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C
ontemporary epistemologists often borrow from act 
and rule-based ethical models in building their theo­
ries. The turn away from such models toward a virtue 
approach by certain ethicists has therefore attracted 
the attention of epistemologists as well. I argue in this paper that 
a theory of belief formation centering on the concept of epistemic 
virtue works only if it has a strong internalist component regard­
ing matters of justification. First, I critique a type of externalist 
reliabilism, Plantinga's theory of warrant, in order to illustrate 
why internalist considerations ought to be made in developing 
an epistemic theory regarding belief formation. Second, I demon­
strate how Linda Zagzebski's epistemic virtue theory inherits 
impoverished aspects of Plantingan r~liabilism, thereby helping 
me to illustrate the necessity of the internalist-virtue integration 
mentioned above. Third, I briefly outline one way in which 
internalist, deontic concepts and the concept of epistemic virtue 
may be integrated. 
Before demonstrating why Plantinga's theory of warrant 
is an insufficient account of belief formation, it is necessary to 
summarily indicate the differences between internalism and ex­
ternalism (particularly Plantinga's reliabilist theory of proper 
fUl1ction), and most importantly, the distinction between internal 
justification and Plantingan warrant. Internalists, like their deon­
tological counterparts in ethics, are essentially concerned with 
the permissibility of beliefs, or whether an agent is acting in 
accordance with epistemic duty. In order for a belief to be justi­
fied, the agent must have cognitive access to the grounds upon 
Tedesro is a 2000 graduate ifthe Oi~ ifthe Hdy Ov;s 11here he studied OassU:s 
amPhilaophy. He plans to pursue aPh.D. inPhilaophy. 
Episteme • Volume XI. • September 2000 
7 The Call of Duty and Beyond 
which the justification depends. The ability to determine whether 
a belief is ·justified is within the believer's control. In contrast, 
externalist theories typically require no such internal cognitive 
access. The main concern of reliabilism, a popular form of exter­
nalism, is to form as many true beliefs as possible, with the 
reliability of the agent's cognitive mechanisms serving as the 
primary condition for the belief to be true. The ideas of warrant, 
a reliabilist requirement for true belief formation, and justifica­
tion are not to be conflated. On the difference between Plantin­
gan warrant and justification, John Zeis states: 
As Plantinga's critique in the Warrant volumes 
makes clear, one of the fundamental differences 
between what he conceives of as warrant and 
what he and most others conceive of as justifica­
tion is that warrant is (almost exclusively) an ex­
ternalist property of belief, whereas justification 
has a strong internalist constraint. What does such 
a difference entail? Most generally, I think it 
entails a difference in the level of reflective consid­
eration. A belief may be warranted in Plantinga's 
sense, and there may be little or virtually no reflec­
tive consideration of the belief. Such reflective 
consideration of course would typically involve 
the consideration of grounds, evidence, epistemic 
duty-fulfillment and the like. (33) 
The warrant of a belief depends upon factors that can be met 
without, or independent of, cognitive control on the part of the 
agent. On the other hand, the criteria for justification can be met 
only if the believer is in a certain amount of cognitive control, or 
as Zeis would suggest, engages in a sufficient "level of reflective 
considera tion." 
I. 
At the heart of Plantinga's theory of epistemic warrant is 
the notion of proper function. He grants that this stipulation in 
itself is not sufficient for warrant, and goes on to outline other 
necessary conditions for its entailment, namely that an agent is in 
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an epistemically sound environment and that his cognitive facul­
ties are working in accordance with their design plan: 
We may say that a belief B has warrant for 5 if and 
only if the relevant segments (the segments in­
volved in the production of B) are functioning 
properly in a cognitive environment sufficiently 
similar to that for which 5' s faculties are designed; 
and the modules of the design plan governing the 
production of Bare (1) aimed at truth, and (2) such 
that there is a high objective probability that a 
belief formed in accordance with those modules 
(in that sort of cognitive environment) is true; and 
the more firmly 5 believes B the more warrant B 
has for (Plantinga 19) 
The IIproduction" of a true belief and the "high objective proba­
bility" that this belief is true are major aspects of Plantinga's 
requirements for warrant that are reminiscent of a consequential­
ist model in ethics, utilitarianism. In a characteristically conse­
quentialist manner, the proper means required to produce true 
beliefs are not stipulated by the criteria Plantinga offers. Proper 
function itself is not a means to the end of producirig true beliefs, 
but rather is a necessary condition for warrant that does not 
require any conscious activity on the part of the belief forming 
agent. Further, quantitative consideration of the probability of 
truth value reminds us of the objective 'weighing' of conse­
quences associated with utilitarianism. The utilitarian agent acts 
in such a way that maximizes happiness, with the probability 
that this maximizai:ion will occur having been taken into consid­
eration before the action is carried out. 5ince the maxim for the 
reliabilist is truth (what would usually, be 'pleasure' or 
'happiness' in a utilitarian theory of ethics), the end here is to 
produce as much truth as possible. Truth is therefore rendered 
calculable and the success of the agent's epistemic activity is 
quantitatively considered. 
When he introduces the notion of congenial cognitive 
environment to complement the proper functioning of the agent's 
belief-forming mechanism, Plantinga offers a short example: 
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Your automobile might be in perfect working or­
der, despite the fact that it will not run well at the 
top of Pike's Peak, or under water, or on the moon. 
We must therefore add another component to 
warrant; your faculties must be in good working 
order; and the environment must be appropriate 
for your particular repertoire of epistemic power. 
(7) 
Now this example illustrates that an entity functioning properly 
must be situated in an environment conducive to its activity if 
that action is to actually take place properly. So it is evident here 
that external factors can inhibit a properly functioning mecha­
nism from realizing its proper ends. This point is self-evident and 
not one to be challenged in itself. But its implications in the 
context of Plantinga's theory are significant and ought to be paid 
mind. I use an example of my own that involves an automobile to 
show that there are internal considerations to be made that 
Plantinga overlooks: An automobile that I am accustomed to 
driving is functioning properly because all the mechanical parts 
are working. I can count on the fact that the vehicle will noE 
malfunction on its own accord. It is functioning properly, but 
driving it one day, I make a mistake and crash into a telephone 
pole. In this case I did not do my duty, or fulfill an obligation l'o 
use the mechanism properly.l Now a reliabilist might say in reply 
that my improper use of the vehicle might stem from some sort of 
outside, inhibiting factor, even one much less extreme than 
Plantinga's, that prevents me from using the mechanism prop­
erly. In other words, the state of reliability was hindered from 
without. In the case that my environment is conducive to proper 
driving, however, there are clear internal considerations to be 
made in this instance about the lack of fulfillment of my duties as 
a driver. An evaluation of this matter from the viewpoint that an 
external phenomenon must have c.aused me to crash the vehicle 
would skirt the issue that there are duties and obligations that I 
ought to fulfill in acting responsibly. 
For Plantinga, there are scenarios in which the agent's 
cognitive faculties function properly in a suitable environment 
but cannot sufficiently provide for the warrant of beliefs. My 
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criticisms cannot therefore stand to effectively challenge 
Plantinga's theory of warrant unless I consider its third compo­
nent, the design plan of an agent's cognitive mechanism. As is the 
case for an organ or other biological entities and systems, cogni­
tive faculties are said by Plantinga to have a particular design 
plan that serves as a "blueprint" of their particular function (13). 
He states, liThe purpose of the heart is to pump blood; that of our 
cognitive faculties (overall) is to supply us with reliable informa­
tion: about our environment, about the past, about the thoughts 
and feelings of others, and so on" (14). Now Plantinga runs into a 
problem here in trying to illustrate that the relationship between 
our cognitive purpose and the relevant faculties is of a similar 
nature to the purpose of such an organ as the heart and its 
relation to the applicable biological system. A primary distinction 
that Plantinga fails to draw is that the involuntary activity of the 
heart contrasts with the voluntary cognitive faculties involved in 
belief formation. Belief forming faculties, unlike the heart, require 
a degree of volition internal to the agent; I could choose to not 
form beliefs, or better true beliefs, in spite of the fact that the 
relevant cognitive faculties are in good working order. Even if 
my environment is suitable for such proper function, I can still 
choose to not engage in forming beliefs. Further, the design plan 
of the relevant segments of my cognitive faculties may be aimed 
at h'uth with the objective probability, of true belief formation 
being high, yet these faculties do not have to necessarily be used 
accordingly. 
Closely related to the voluntary nature of belief formation 
is the idea that the relevant cognitive mechanisms are under a 
certain amount of the agent's control. That is, belief formation 
can be initiated through a decision on the part of the agent, and 
further, carried out with accessibility to the mechanism that 
ultimately justifies the belief. Presumably, proper function itself 
is maintained insofar as phenomena like cognitive disorder or 
external pressures do not corrupt the agent's belief forming 
mechanism. These considerations, however, denote inhibiting 
factors not in the believer's controL As in my automobile exam­
ple, consideration of phenomena internal to the agent and within 
her control is necessary in evaluating belief formation. 
The notion of a design plan even further illustrates the 
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state of unawareness and lack of control allowed in achieving 
Plantingan warrant. If Plantinga posits that it is proper function 
in accordance with the design plan that entails warrant, then 
what conscious, controlled activities internal to the agent, if any, 
contribute to the warrant of belief? Now concessions could be 
made to Plantinga when we consider some of the necessary com­
ponents that any reasonable epistemologist would have to take 
into account when forming a theory of true belief. As most would 
agree, our cognitive faculties have to be functioning properly, or 
as they are supposed to, within a congenial environment for 
sound epistemic judgments to be made. But even if Plantinga is 
correct and such criteria are sufficient for warrant, then the idea 
of warrant itself (when considering the above arguments) is still 
insufficient in satisfying the requirements for producing true 
beliefs. We then need to incorporate a strong component of 
justification into a theory of belief formation, and I illustrate one 
way in which this may be accomplished after showing that 
Zagzebski's epistemic virtue theory collapses into a Plantingan 
type of reliabilism. 
n. 
Linda Zagzebski raises an interesting criticism of reliabil­
ism by suggesting that there is room for luck in its theories. With 
an agent's belief-forming mechanism working reliably, relia­
bilists can assume that luck, under normal circumstances, will 
more times than not bring about true beliefs (Zagzebski 39). Now 
this point illustrates the dangers of reliabilism well. With the 
desire to seek truth should come the desire to avoid falsehood, 
but the inheritance of the utilitarian lradition by reliabilists has 
allowed them to go as far as to say that any epistemic means may 
be used so long as more truth is produced than falsehood. From a 
traditional internalist perspective and presumably from Zagzeb~ 
ski's standpoint, this lack of regulation on epistemic means is 
unacceptable. The guessing agent is not fulfilling his duty to form 
beliefs responsibly, while at the same time, the intellectual habit 
of guessing is certainly an epistemic vice. I demonstrate below 
how vicious epistemic means like guessing could still be em­
ployed within a virtue theory like Zagzebski's, thereby helping 
me make the case that epistemic virtue can only contribute to a 
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theory of belief formation if strong deontic concepts, like duty, 
are mandated for justification to exist. 
Zagzebski argues "that a virtue-based epistemology is 
well suited to analyze the traditional concepts of epistemology, 
namely, justification and knowledge" (11). For this virtue theo­
rist, the concept of epistemic virtue is not evaluated by identify­
ing whether a belief is formed properly, nor if an agent is 
disposed to believing correctly. Further, a virtue is not just a 
disposition to act in the 'right' way because virtuous action may 
not correspond to act-based, normative criteria (Zagzebski 15-6). 
The believer, from the perspective of theories based on act-based 
criteria, is not necessarily 'right' to the fullest extent, but simply 
'not wrong.' Zagzebski emphasizes that, in a theory of epistemic 
virtue, 'right' does not simply mean 'not wrong.' She looks to 
virtue ethics to explain this point: 
The focus of this type of ethics is on avoiding 
blameworthiness rather than on achieving moral 
praiseworthiness. Virtue ethics, in contrast, allows 
for a greater range of evaluative levels and gives 
due regard to the fact that our moral aim is not 
only to avoid the bottom level of the moral scale 
but to end up as high on the scale as possible. (28) 
Zagzebski claims that her interpretation of deontic concepts is 
broad enough to correspond to almost any virtue theory (232). 
She states the following about the different types of virtue theo­
ries: 
According to a merely agent-focused theory, the 
behavior of virtuous persons does not make an act 
right but is simply the best way to determine 
rightness, whereas a pure virtue theory treats the 
rightness of an act as strictly dependent upon 
virtue. In a pure virtue theory, an act is right 
because it is the sort of act a virtuous person might 
do, whereas in an agent-focused theory, what is 
done by a virtuous person is just the best criterion 
of rightness. (232) 
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Although she admits that her theory reads in such a way that her 
ideas may, at times, correspond most easily to pure virtue theo­
ries, Zagzebski nevertheless asserts that her first series of deontic 
definitions does not take /I internal states of the agent" into con­
sideration (235). 
For Zagzebski, a virtue approach to epistemology ex­
pands the realm of both praise and reproach in passing judg­
ments on a belief and the way in which it is formed. In other 
words, the judgments of permissibility (the formation of a belief 
that renders the agent simply wrong or not wrong) that charac­
terize epistemic evaluation in the act-based tradition are not the 
only evaluative criteria used in her virtue-based model. The 
agent's state of being right can extend beyond his just having 
done what is permissible-he can act in a praiseworthy manner 
(Zagzebski 233). She describes one way to characterize virtuous 
behavior: 
A virtuous person's behavior arises out of virtuous 
motives and is reliably successful in achieving 
virtuous ends. What makes the virtuous person 
reliably successful in addition to her motive is her 
understanding of the rnoral and nonmoral facts 
about the situations she encounters. The level of 
understanding a virtuous person has, then, is 
whatever is sufficient to make her reliably success­
ful in producing the ends of virtue. (234) 
So, virtuous motivation leading to the reliable production of 
virtuous ends is essentially her take on the requirements of 
epistemic success. There are clearly aspects of this account that 
are both internalist and reliabilist in the sense that the motiva­
tional factors are internal and the reliable production of ends are 
reminiscent of Plantinga's reliabilist theory. The difference be­
tween this aspect of ZagzebsHs theory and Plantingafs reliabil­
ism is that the nature of the believer's motivation is necessarily 
virtuous and the end to be produced is virtuous as well. But the 
theory is still characteristically reliabilist in the sense that the 
epistemic goal is to produce true beliefs. 
Virtuous motivation is not enough to constitute a suffi­
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dent internal aspect of this theory. I do not have to have cogni­
tive access to my belief-forming mechanism in order to be moti­
vated in such a way that Zagzebski describes. All that her inter­
nalist feature does is add value to the epistemic end.2 I am 
motivated to produce this end, virtuously perhaps, but neverthe­
less there is no check on my belief forming process other than 
that it is directed toward virtue. Therefore, insofar as I seek to 
produce virtuous ends, with a reliable mechanism to produce 
such ends, I can achieve epistemic success. Clearly then, Zagzeb­
ski inherits aspects of the utilitarian model that are intrinsic to 
reliabilist theories like Plantinga's. Planting a concentrates little, if 
not at all, on stipulating the proper means by which true beliefs 
may be formed. The reliability of belief-forming mechanisms is a 
necessary condition under which beliefs may be warranted but 
not the means by which we may come to believe and be justified. 
So Zagzebski, if she is to separate herself from Plantinga at all, 
must make the case that a virtuously motivated agent who directs 
himself toward a virtuous end actually forms the belief virtu­
ously. However, cannot I be motivated in a certain way but not 
act in a way properly reflecting the nature of that motivation? In 
other words, can I use means that are characteristic of epistemic 
viciousness like guessing? If I can, then this component of 
Zagzebski's virtue theory collapses into a reliabilist model; I 
could act to produce an end without any definitive internal 
consideration of how I am to attain such an end. 
If we concentrate on Zagzebski's treatment of justifica­
tion, the dominating presence of reliabilism in her theory is made 
even more evident. She states, 1/ A justified belief is what a person 
who is motivated by intellectual virtue, and who has the under­
standing of his cognitive situation a virtuous person would have, 
might believe in like circumstances" (241). Key to our discussion 
is how we interpret what constitutes, for Zagzebski, an agent's 
"understanding of his cognitive situation." Now, if we refer to 
her description (which I cited earlier) of that which constitutes 
virtuous behavior, then this "understanding" implies an aware­
ness of the moral and non-moral facts of a particular situation. 
An awareness of such facts, however, does not necessarily sug­
gest a state of cognitive accessibility to the grounds that justify 
my belief because my cognitive situation, despite my awareness 
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of relevant facts, may be one in which I am uncertain of which 
relevant facts lead to cognitive certainty. 
Zagzebski grants that her theory can be interpreted as 
having stTonger externalist tendencies than she herself attributes 
to it, for her concept of virtuous motivation could be changed to 
the extent that the internal component of the theory bears less 
significance. At the same time, she sees the theory as adaptable to 
an internalist framework if the production of virtuous ends is 
eliminated from the criterion of epistemic success and attention is 
given solely to motivational factors in defining intellectual 
virtue.3 The modifications suggested here to tailor the theory 
toward internalism are not suitable, and the concessions to exter­
nalism unnecessary, given the already prominent reliabilist fea­
tures of the theory. The internal motivational factors stipulated 
by Zagzebski need not be lessened for her theory to retain its 
great reliabilist appeaL 
As mentioned previously, even if I have virtuous motiva­
tions directed toward virtuous ends and I deem my cognitive 
mechanisms to be reliable, I may still use vicious or irresponsible 
means in order to produce such ends. As long as my primary goal 
is to produce ends, independent of the nature of these ends, I can 
use means unbecoming a virtuous agent. To use an example, let 
us say I have decided to go to a lecture given by a famous 
professor on Aristotle's theory of friendship. I drive to the lecture 
in the same reliable automobile mentioned in the earlier example. 
I am motivated to get to the lecture because I have this desire to 
understand Aristotle. Virtuously motivated to learn, I keep driv­
ing, only to realize that I am lost after coming to a stop sign. Not 
knowing whether I must turn right or left to find my destination, 
I randomly guess. Here, independent of whether I guessed cor­
rectly, I did not use virtuous means to attain a virtuous end. The 
use of a vicious epistemic means in this example, guessing, could 
have stemmed from a number of factors, but there is no basis for 
its permissibility. Further, I could have an awareness of the facts 
about the situation that I have encountered, an awareness that is 
one of the components that characterizes virtuous behavior for 
Zagzebski, while still failing to use virtuous means in resolving 
the situation. For instance, I know that during some point in my 
trip I became lost. Also, I am aware of my destination and the 
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reasons for my wanting to reach that destination. These are the 
facts surrounding the situation that I encounter, and my guessing 
which way I ought to turn is a means not in accord with the 
virtuous nature of both my motivation and goaL 
Zagzebski's understanding of the role that virtue plays in 
belief formation is not compatible with a strong internalism. She 
states, "Although I have rejected purely externalist accounts of 
knowledge, I have also argued that a weaker form of externalism 
is right since 'virtue' is a success term" (333). If virtue is such a 
kind of term, and strong virtuous motivations are to be the 
primary, if not the only internal criteria in her theory, then it 
would seem that our virtuous motivations still stem from a desire 
to produce virtuous ends. Since Zagzebski thinks weaker exter­
nal theories are right because of their understanding of virtue, 
then the sort of term 'virtue' is in the context of belief formation 
would have to change if we have strong internalist convictions. 
We are now faced with the questions about the terms of 
virtue. Early in Virtues of the Mind, Zagzebski states: 
The mark of a virtue theory of morality is that the 
primary object of evaluation is persons or inner 
traits of persons rather than acts. To describe a 
good person is to describe that person's virtues, 
and it is maintained that a virtue is reducible 
neither to the performance of acts independently 
identified as right nor to a disposition to perform 
such acts. There is both more and less to a moral 
virtue than a disposition to act in the right way. 
There is more because a virtue also includes being 
disposed to have characteristic emotions, desires, 
motives, and attitudes. There is less because a 
virtuous person does not invariably act in a way 
that can be fully captured by any set of indepen­
dent normative criteria. (15-6) 
Despite Zagzebski's claims that virtue theory often denotes inner 
characteristics of the agent that are out of the scope of normative 
criteria, I believe that the chief characteristic of virtue is that it 
disposes the individual to ultimately act in a good way. Now 
17 The Call of Duty and Beyond 
virtue theory may require degrees of evaluation both above and 
below rightness, but an action-promoting disposition aids the 
individual, initially, to act in such a way that is 'right.' If 
Zagzebski is correct in saying that from an act-based perspective, 
'right' means simply 'not wrong,' then virtue can initially dispose 
us to do just that-what is 'not wrong.' The virtuous agent is 
expected to go beyond obligation (beyond what is 'not wrong'), 
but can still be disposed toward action by the virtue even if that 
action cannot be deemed praiseworthy, or something else beyond 
'not wrong.' The higher degrees of meritorious action are cer­
tainly characteristic of virtuous disposition, but every good act of 
any degree is, at bottom, 'not wrong.' This condition of being 
'not wrong' is indeed a state of rightness, one that is ensured in 
belief formation by the minimum, deontic criteria of internal 
justification. Beyond these basic requirements for justification, it 
is the primary function of epistemic virtue to dispose us toward 
goodness in forming and holding true beliefs. 
III. 
A concept of epistemic virtue can complement traditional 
internalism to form a theory that takes into account a sufficient 
component of deontic concepts. At I:he au tseL, we sl10lild under­
stand justification as a term of rightness and virtue as a term of 
goodness. As in ethics, the right and the good should serve 
different functions here. An action is right if, at minimum, it 
meets the requirements of permissibility, thereby not violating 
any duty or obligation. In its negative sense, rightness therefore 
fundamentally designates that an action is 'not wrong.' Actions 
that exceed obligation or go beyond the call of duty are not only 
right, but can also be evaluated in terms of their goodness. Now, 
on the nature of the relationship between the good and the right, 
we can say that the right is necessary for the promotion of the 
good in the sense that it provides a foundation upon, or (I 
framework within which the good is cultivated. It is with this 
relationship in mind that I outline how internal justification and 
a concept of epistemic virtue may be unified. 
First, in forming true beliefs, an agent must have an 
awareness of the cognitive mechanisms that he uses to justify his 
beliefs. The process is then sufficiently under the agent's control 
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when in having this awareness, he reflects on that which is 
cognitively accessible to him. If a belief is formed in such a state 
of cognitive control, then the agent is epistemically dutiful in that 
he has met the minimum requirements of justifying his belief. 
Being internally justified in such a way, the agent is 'right.' 
Second, the agent may be disposed toward good (we could use a 
variety of terms here that designate degrees of goodness) belief 
formation by epistemic virtue, therefore having gone beyond the 
call of duty. 
Virtue is both an epistemic aid and reward, for it con­
tributes to, and is cultivated by good belief formation. Since the 
minimum requirements for internal justification are purely deon­
tic here, however, epistemic virtue need not be a necessary factor 
in fulfilling such requirements. There are, of course, varying 
degrees of goodness that the virtuous person may be disposed 
toward in action. The same degrees of goodness apply to belief 
formation as well, but our epistemic standards should first and 
foremost establish what entails rightness in the belief forming 
4 process. 
Notes 
I I thank Stan Yeung for those late night discussions in which we strug­
fled with this example. 
Please see Zagzebski, p. 313. 
3 Please see Zagzebski, p. 330. She has Plantinga's theory of proper 
function in mind here. 
4 I thank Gavin Colvert for his undying guidance and the revisions he 
made on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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